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Between resistance and resilience: a study of flood risk 
management in the Don catchment area (UK) 
Barry Goodchild, Rebecca Sharpe and Chris Hanson (Sheffield Hallam University) 
 
The river Don catchment area in Sheffield and Rotherham offers a good place for a case study of 
flood risk management, given the impact of a flooding event in 2007 and the way in which local events 
have become entwined with national and international policy shifts. To interpret local policy, a 
combination of systems based and socio-cultural theory is used. Both the theories and the case study 
serve to disentangle the multiple meanings of resilience. Understood in opposition to flood resistance, 
resilience has only limited applicability in an area such as the case study where engineering works 
protect employment and infrastructure. Resilience as a policy discourse also lacks political 
transparency and a recognition of socio-cultural influences. Underlying the shift towards resilient 
styles of management is an appreciation of the importance of capacity, to learn and to act. The case 
study identifies blockages to the realisation of that capacity. 
 
The aim of this paper is to examine flood risk management in England within a multi-
theoretical framework applied to the river Don and its tributaries in Sheffield and 
Rotherham. Flooding is a recurrent threat in England and flood management is a 
necessary means through which English cities are responding to the prospect of 
climate change. At the same time, the methods of flood risk management have 
undergone a welcome change, according to various authors (Hartmann and 
Driessen, 2013: Liao 2012), as governments in many countries, including the UK, 
favour flexible, ‘resilient’, social learning approaches, rather than ‘hard’ engineering 
projects. 1 The preparation of this particular case study of flood protection measures, 
from June 2007 to June 2017, provides a means of assessing the extent and 
implications of recent policy changes, including the exact meaning of resilience.  
The account is divided into three main sections.  
Section one ‘Systems and social order’ is about relevant analytical frameworks, 
their assumptions and contents.  
Section two comprises the case study. It includes an analysis of the problem, a 
narrative of the policy response in the past ten years  
Section three interprets the local policy response in the light of the frameworks. 
Systems and social order: conceptualising flood risk management 
In the simplest terms, two contrasting analytical frameworks may be identified for 
flood protection, based respectively on contrasting ontologies- the material 
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processes of flows, forces, populations and systems, and the social processes of 
interest group politics and social order (Archer 1996: Lockwood 1964). Given, the 
existence of hybrid approaches that assume ‘coupled systems’ between the physical 
and social worlds (Liu et al 2013), three relevant frameworks may be identified:  
 adaptive management, based on turbulent, ecological systems 
(Gunderson et al 2002):  
 transition management, based on measures to change established socio 
technical (or human dominated) systems (Ernstson et al 2010): 
 the management of expectations based on the social construction of risk 
(Hartmann 2012). 
Adaptive management 
To discuss each approach in turn: Theories of adaptive management summarise the 
assumption of many aspects of contemporary flood management,  including 
resilience. In principle, resilience means the ability of the system to absorb or 
withstand disturbance (Ingirige and Amaratunga 2013) or in technical language, its 
ability to cope with ‘panarchy’, an intermediate situation betwee chaos and order, the 
predictable and the unpredictable (Innes and Booher 1999, 22). In addition, 
panarchy and adaptive flood management imply in principle a preference for 
‘natural’, as this term is used in UK policy debates 2 or ‘green’ flood risk management 
as used elsewhere (Janssen et al 2015), without heavy engineering works.  
There is, however, a subtle shift in attitudes once panarchy is applied to routine 
flood protection. In ecological systems, flooding is a natural and potentially creative 
force. . Once transferred to the management of human environments (Davoudi 2014) 
and applied to property, with all its legal rigidities (Tempels and Hartmann 2014), 
flooding assumes a negative meaning- as system failure. Moreover, in seeking to 
avoid system failure, the concept of resilience becomes muddied. The ecological 
concept of resilience involves adaptation in contrast to resistance, this latter meaning 
the ability to withstand stresses and shocks without change and without 
dysfunctional consequences (Norris et al 2008). In policy discourses, however, as for 
example stated in UK government advice (DEFRA-EA 2010) resilience is likely to 
encompass specific engineering works intended to ensure that critical infrastructure 
can withstand extreme events.  
Adaptive management is, nevertheless, distinctive in two other ways.  
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First, the socio-ecological system is assumed to be too large and its behaviour 
too unpredictable to be engineered as a whole. The management of panarchy 
involves a search for multiple solutions and multiple measures in a way that favours 
a process of co-evolution between governmental bodies and other actors, that 
includes spontaneous responses to events as these occur (Klein et al 1998, 263) 
and that implies ‘community resilience’ (Norris et al 2008, as well as ecological 
resilience.  
The latter concept deservies more consideration. Apllied to flooding, community 
resilience means the ability of local communities to organise and protect themselves 
and recover through property-level improvements and other measures. Whether 
residents and businesses can and are likely to do so is another question. The take-
up of property-level measures is typically low in the absence of determined efforts to 
encourage uptake (Bhattacharya-Mis et al 2015). To give a specific example, a 
survey of Cockermouth (Cumbria, England) a small, flood affected town found that 
despite a huge increase in insurance ‘only 11%’ of small businesses ‘had installed 
flood resilient wall finishes’ 3 Communities and firms vary, in their ability and 
willingness to act and some will not be able to help themselves without material help, 
rather than just encouragement.  
Second, adaptive management is distinct in the range and number of 
institutional actors who are affected. In relation to a river floodplain, adaptive 
management would use the local catchment area as a basis for co-ordinated action 
and would seek to a public consensus on which to base action and detailed 
management (Innes & Booher 1999).  
Agreeing a co-ordinated, integrated catchment plan is likely to be complex, 
however. Potential water overspill areas may have very different meanings for locals, 
experts and managers (Kati and Jari 2016). Public involvement promotes 
transparency, but is time consuming and, depending on local circumstances, not 
necessarily of value in finding flexible solutions (Menzel & Buchecker 2013). Further, 
detailed co-ordination and management may prove cumbersome , as Coulthard and 
Frostick (2010) have suggested in a case study of Hull (East Yorkshire).  
Transition management 
The limitations of adaptive management suggest that production and consumption 
practices need to be changed to cope with long-term risks. Transition management 
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deals exactly with this second type of factor and second type of system comprising 
multiple, overlapping networks of actors, supply chains and associated technology, 
each locked into particular forms of production and consumption practices and so 
requires some specific event or external ‘push’ to facilitate change. Change may be 
stimulated, for example, through any combination of local experiments, in so-called 
‘niches’ or through a concerted policy effort, the so-called ‘regime’ of public finance 
and regulation. Whatever the transition pathway, whether from niches or regimes, 
however, the emphasis is invariably on planned, managed or intended change rather 
than a spontaneous cycle of destruction and renewal of socio-ecological systems.  
As presented by its main advocates (Geels 2005: 11: Kemp et al 2007: 
Loorbach 2010), transition management involves a multiple, multi-level passage from 
one state of a socio-technical system to another, with the state after transition 
representing a higher level of achievement on a variety of sustainability criteria- 
energy use, recycling, pollution, biodiversity and so on. Governments work with 
producers, in a process of co-evaluation, making products more sustainable and 
resilient. Co-evolution applied to flood risk management implies a reformulation of 
the role of local authorities and other public sector actors as an ‘honest broker’ 
(Ingirige & Wedawatta 2014) who advises property owners on a range of measures.  
Co-evolution suggests, in addition, that regulations such as planning controls, 
building controls and environmental regulation are merely one element in a panoply 
of measures that steer and redefine economic behaviour in a sustainable direction. 
Regulation, including the expectation of future regulation, can promote innovation. 
However, regulation is only likely to become effective once extensive compliance is 
already realised through voluntary means. (Kemp et al 2007: Parto 2007). Whether 
or not transition is fully realised is typically problematic, however. Case studies 
(Moloney and Horne2015: Vandevyvere & Nevens 2015) suggest that the various 
levels often fail to work together; for example local initiatives are not sufficiently 
supported by national government.  
The management of expectations 
Personal experience and the perception of that experience mark the concerns of the 
third approach, dealing with the management of expectations . Expectations and 
perception are linked to awareness. Moreover, awareness of risk is based ultimately 
on individual experience, knowledge and memory. However, a single ‘collective 
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memory’ is an impossibility (Douglas 2013, 59-60), unless the memories of different 
individuals are institutionalised into the cultural practices and working practices that 
cumulatively comprise the established social order. 
Conversely, assumptions about social order influence the form and type of 
institutional arrangement and the style of risk management- as, in other words, an 
aspect of socio-cultural theory as this approach is also called. Two bases for social 
order may be distinguished (Douglas 1999)- grid, this comprising a mesh of 
regulations, as exemplified by a bureaucracy and group, this comprising informal and 
voluntary alliance of individuals and the associated methods of social control. 
Equally, the strength of the social order may vary, so resulting in four styles of action, 
as shown in the left hand column in Table 1, below. Each style makes different 
assumptions about social organisation and the social assumptions of risk 
management, including flood management policy.  
Table 1 
High grid/ high group styles of action cover conventional land use planning and 
water engineering. They favour spatial order and the management of nature, using a 
co-ordinated range of policy measures for different areas, places and types of 
property. In contrast, low grid/ low group styles are about individual resilience, 
responsiveness and assume that individual organisation and initiative will suffice. 
Low grid/ high group is about the promotion of supportive communities and therefore 
community resilience, whether residential communities or informal business groups. 
The final category, high grid/ low group- isolation and fatalism- might be equated with 
isolation and hopelessness. In circumstances, where nothing can be done, fatalism 
may nevertheless be a realistic response. 
Grid/ group theory does not offer a system. In the first place, it provides a 
classification of the varied and ‘clumsy’ array of perceptions and preferred solutions 
of different groups and governments (Verweij, Douglas et al 2006), with the 
modalities of action reflecting the wider political culture, the institutions already in 
place and their interaction with one another. Grid/ group theory has been applied to 
flood management by Hartmann (2012), but only in a limited way that treats the 
different logics of action as an aspect of an over-arching policy, rather than in the 
original sense off Douglas as a shifting set of partly complementary and partly 
conflicting institutional principles. Grid-group theory is therefore about the 
management of expectations only as intent. Because expectations involve cultural 
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assumptions and conflicting institutional principles, they may be unmanageable 
either in whole or part.  
In addition, the grid/ group framework assumes a dialectic relationship between 
‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, between hierarchical governmental agencies and non-
hierarchical organizations who feel that they are at the ‘border’, to use the term of 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) of conventional politics. For different reasons, neither 
bureaucracy nor the market encourages critical thinking or radical change. The 
periphery, in contrast, is alert to the failures of the centre, is easily alarmed by 
threats to nature and is able to use local knowledge to generate warnings and 
solutions. A case study of flood protection by Whatmore (2013) in the small town of 
Pickering (Yorkshire, England) provides an example. In this case, citizens’ action 
and local knowledge led to an acceptance of small-scale, low impact, upstream flood 
storage in a way that the technical experts had not previously considered. Contrary 
to the example in Pickering, however, non-hierarchical organisations and pressure 
groups do not necessarily favour egalitarian policies, as their membership may be 
drawn from a narrow social group. 
The frameworks together 
Taking all this together, the frameworks may be summarised as follows: 
Table 2 
Adaptive management and transition management are systems approaches 
concerned with the capacity of governments to manage and reduce risk in the short 
and long-term in a process of co-evolution with other institional actors. As such they 
both assume the existence of a rationalist planning cycle, that involves the 
separation of means and ends and the use of systematic analytical techniques . 
(Goodchild 2017, 129-133). The details the planning cycle vary. In adaptive 
management, the cycle starts from an event such as a disaster and then moves to 
recovery and longer term strategies, based on the avoidance of similar problems in 
the future. 4 In transition management, the cycle starts with the identification of 
agreed targets, expressing different aspects of sustainable practice and of 
'pathways' to reach those targets (Geels 2005: Goodchild 2017, 226-231; Kemp et al 
2007). For both approaches, however, the planning cycles can be conceived as a 
series of decision making stages that, encourage social learning, including the 
evaluation of outcomes. Learning and related concepts such as ‘capacity’- to 
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process and evaluate information and to act effectively- are, therefore, a necessary 
aspect of resilience and in some accounts (Liao 2012: Newman 2011) the defining 
aspect.  
Equally, however, if redefined in terms of learning, the meaning of resilience 
changes, away from a type of measure to the type of management process. Under 
the pressure of events, individuals, groups and public authorities learn to anticipate, 
prevent and cope with events and, in doing so, work out new responses. Put slightly 
differently, if defined as process the term has no necessary ecological 
characteristics.. 
Socio-cultural theory is compatible with a planning cycle that starts with a 
disaster and also with ‘learning’ as an individual and institutional process. Douglas 
(2013, 59) recognises, for example ‘the memory of past investigations and 
prcedents’ as an influence on the perception of danger. Other than in the highly 
managed, high grid approach of bureaucracies, however, socio-cultural theory 
suggests a relatively flexible, pragmatic and sometimes reactive style of learning, 
without deliberate decision making stages.  
The case study 
The river Don catchment in Sheffield and Rotherham illustrates many aspects of 
current approaches to the management of flood risk, especially in an urban area 
where the risk affects business and employment. It is also a good place for a case 
study as local events have become entwined with initiatives at an all England and, in 
some cases European Union (EU) level. Other studies have examined business 
resilience per se 5 and the tension in environmental design between technical 
expertise and local place attachment (Haughton 2015). The interest here is about the 
relationship between flood protection, business and urban governance at a strategic, 
district-wide level.  
Methodology and presentation 
The underlying methodology is informed by a modified version of the ‘phronetic’ 
method of Flyvbjerg (2004: 2006). Phronesis is the Greek word for practical 
judgement. The phronetic method involves bringing together and, where necessary, 
contrasting varied information to reveal the interrelations between technical 
8 
rationalities and the power of interest groups. This case study brings together and 
contrasts different sources of information. It is concerned, however with the capacity 
as well as the power of different actors and, in addition, the extent to which local 
policy and practice is consistent with the various theoretical frameworks and a shift 
to resilience. 
In this context, the main institutional actors are as follows; 
- The local authorities for Sheffield and Rotherham, elected bodies with a 
wide range of responsibilities for the welfare of the population: 
- The Environment Agency, a national agency with regional offices 
responsible inter alia for the coordination of flood protection measures and 
for directing central government funds into local projects: 
- A private water utility company, Yorkshire Water, responsible for the supply 
of drinking water, sewage disposal and aspects of land drainage and also a 
major land owner around water courses: 
- The two Chambers of Commerce for Sheffield and Rotherham, representing 
local businesses:  
- And finally, a shifting and diverse array of local amenity and environmental 
groups. 
The sources of information come from a combination of statistical sources, 
policy documents, the web pages of local groups, the archives of the local 
newspaper, the ‘Sheffield Star’ and a series of interviews with 15 respondents , 
undertaken between 2014 and 2016. The respondents covered officers of the local 
authorities, the Environment Agency and the two Chambers of Commerce as well as 
six small businesses, located in areas with a known risk of flooding. Fifteen 
businesses were contacted but full interviews could only be secured with three. A 
further three businesses supplied information over the telephone. All the interviews 
were semi-structured, with a schedule of questions specified in advance. The officers 
were asked about the role, activities and plans of their organisation, as well as their 
experience over the past few years, especially when working with businesses and 
their perception of the main policy issues. The businesses were asked about the 
number of jobs at risk, their experience of flooding and their plans to cope with any 
future event. 
The intention throughout was to generate a narrative showing the interaction 
between events, analyses and the response of instutional actors. The presentation of 
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the case study therefore starts with a summary of the problem, before moving to the 
policy response and then, in a subsequent section, a discussion of the policy 
response in the light of the theories and previous studies. As such, the narrative is 
intended to disentangle the chronology of events from its interpretation.  
Chronology and interpretation cannot be wholly separated however. The 
account starts with a sudden event, a flood, followed by exercises in learning and 
innovation. The structure of the account might therefore suggest implicit support for 
the existence of a rationalist planning process. Subsequent events have not followed 
a single planning cycle, however. Different cycles of plan preparation and 
implementation have operated alongside one another depending on the involvement 
of different layers of government or different policy fields and initiatives. Financial 
constraints and the existence of separate financial planning cycles have led to 
proposals being modified, sometimes at short notice. Further, the response of 
residents and local amenity groups has mostly arisen once the consultation process 
has reached place-specific proposals rather at a strategic stage. Yet this response 
may itself challenge key aspects of a proposal. Actions, measures and decisions 
may therefore be rational as a pragmatic response to constraints, but not rationalist 
in the sense of following a prescriptive model of stages of decision making and 
action. 
Characteristics of the problem 
On 25 June 2007 extreme rain overwhelmed the drainage system in the Done valley 
catchment area. In Sheffield, alone, over 1,200 homes were flooded and more than 
1,000 businesses were affected (SCC, 2013b, 14), including industries of national 
importance. Flood waters rose rapidly, catching people unaware and requiring their 
evacuation from their work place or home. Thousands were left without power and 
two people died.  
The dramatic events of 2007 are not easily forgotten for those directly affected. 
One respondent working for a local agency had been directly affected by the floods 
and provided a vivid account:  
‘From our office window we … were watching this stream of water at the side of the 
road that grew to a foot wide in less than three or four minutes and then grew to 
three foot wide in another five to ten minutes and it was a case of people need to 
move, we need to let people get out cos it was bad.  We used to park across the 
road, by the time I’d got packed up and we were heading out I got across that road 
and it was about a foot deep.’ 
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The river Don within Sheffield and Rotherham is ‘little more than a large stream’ 
in normal conditions (SCC, 2013b, 2), as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: 
Flooding had not occurred for over forty years previous to 2007 and the earlier 
event in 1965 involved water levels that were 1 metre lower (SCC, 2013b). The area 
at risk of flooding is nevertheless considerable, as is shown in Figure 2. Moreover, 
the risk is exacerbated by the way that the local tributaries are set in relatively steep 
sided valleys, are mostly culverted in their urbanised sections and respond quickly to 
rainfall (SCC, 2013c, 13). 
Figure 2:  
The immediate response took the form of collaborative exercises between the 
multiple agencies involved in emergency work. In relation to businesses, the local 
Chambers of Commerce provided the main intermediary and point of contact with 
the local authorities and other public sector agencies. Businesses were also active in 
mutual aid, lending equipment to each other and, for smaller businesses, arranging 
for the use of alternative premises. 
Once the short-term recovery problems were mostly resolved, the long-term 
significance of the 2007 event was to demonstrate the vulnerability of businesses 
and employment. The Don Valley Catchment Area Plan (EA 2010) provides 
estimates of the total number of properties at annual risk of fluvial flooding, without 
however distinguishing between residential and non-residential uses. According to 
this calculation, about 5,000 properties in Sheffield and a further 800 in Rotherham 
are at an annual risk of one per cent or more (EA 2010, 9). The numbers are only 
approximate, as they exclude areas affected by local rainfall events, exclude the 
impact of any trend towards future weather extremes, whilst including properties 
sited in at risk areas covered by existing flood defences. 
The ESRC Consumer Data Research Centre provides an alternative, mappable 
means of estimating the number of residential and non-residential properties at risk 
of flooding, with the number of non-residential properties indicated below. 
Table 3 
Non-residential includes public buildings, but may be taken as a proxy for 
businesses. The total number of residential and non-residential properties at risk is 
less in Rotherham than in Sheffield. However, Rotherham includes a concentration 
of non-residential properties at high risk mostly located in and near the town centre. 
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Figure 3 shows the relevant pattern using a kernel density mapping technique 
(Silverman, 1986). 
Figure 3: 
There is no directly available public dataset that gives employment figures for 
small-scale areas. The Workday Population Census (2011) data at output level may 
be used to give an approximate number. The minimum output area (OA) is 40 
resident households and 100 resident people (The Office of National Statistics, 
2012). If we select the number of OA’s that intersect with flood risk zone 2 (1 in 1000 
year flood) we find that 17.82% of OAs in South Yorkshire are at risk of flooding. This 
equates to a potential maximum of 52,986 jobs in Sheffield and 28,672 jobs in 
Rotherham. Estimates based on Census Output Level data are almost certainly 
overestimates as they include jobs that are outside risk areas.  
Flooding on the scale experienced in 2007 also damaged the urban 
infrastructure- road bridges, railway lines, electricity, water supply and sewage- in a 
way that affected everyone living and working in the locality. For these reasons, 
flooding has become explicitly recognised as a risk in the economic regeneration 
strategies for the wider Sheffield city region (Oxford Economics 2013).  
The policy response 
The novelty of the flood events of 2007 meant that the various agencies responsible 
for flood risk management lacked relevant experience. Their response was to 
undertake a series of risk assessment studies, to seek resources and advice from 
elsewhere and to co-operate with national government in enquiries that covered 
similar flooding events elsewhere in England. The result was a huge and very varied 
amount of policy advice, most notably in two EU initiatives, MARE (Managing 
Adaptive Responses) (2009-2012) 6 and CAMINO (Climate Adaption Mainstreaming 
through Innovation) (2013-2015) 7 and a national policy review, the ‘Pitt Review’ 
(2008).  
MARE and CAMINO, were intended to promote experimentation, innovation 
and multi-national learning. Partly for this reason, they included initiatives that 
subsequently either failed, as in a proposed regional flood management body or for 
which there is no record of implementation, as in a proposal to promote property 
level measures through intermediaries such as DIY stores (Annexes 16 and 17). 
Even if limited in their impact, however, CAMINO and MARE provided additional staff 
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funding at a time when the resources of the local authorities were tested. Indeed, 
lack of staffing resources was itself a reason for their lack of impact. For example, in 
the view of a respondent, a senior local government officer, the regional initiative 
failed because:  
‘it was local authority based and  ... the difficulties that local authorities have been 
undergoing in recent years.’ ‘I bet there’s not one in five of the people who used to 
go to that organisation still working for local authorities, it’s been savage.’ 
Once EU funding disappeared, the local authority lost capacity to organise and 
to act. 
The Pitt review (2008) was different. It had a national frame of reference and 
sought to summarise all relevant policy measures, covering seven main issues: 
reducing the risk of flooding and its impact; the provision of emergency services; 
protecting essential services; better advice and help to those affected; speeding up 
recovery; better prediction in advance. A governmental progress report (DEFRA 
2012) stated that, of the report’s 92 specific recommendations, 43 had been 
implemented, 40 were partly implemented and a further nine were subject to further 
reviews or other complications. 
However, the government’s assessment overstates the extent of 
implementation. To give an example: Pitt Review recommendation 12 (2008, xvi) 
states ‘All local authorities should extend eligibility for home improvement grants and 
loans to include flood resistance and resilience products.’ The eligibility of property 
level grant aid was indeed confirmed by administrative action and was also extended 
to business properties. However, eligibility is only an initial step. The funds also have 
to be made available and in many parts of the country, including South Yorkshire, 
flood resilience work is not a major theme in the small housing improvement 
programmes currently in force.  
The longer term response in Sheffield and Rotherham was undertaken within 
the framework of the strategic management plans that were another 
recommendation of the Pitt Review and were undertaken in accordance with a 
preference for an explicitly coordinated multi-agency ‘partnership’ (EA 2010). The 
same approach was also favoured by the MARE project under whose imprint the 
earliest plans were published. 
To take policies in Sheffield and Rotherham in turn: In Sheffield, policy 
emerged largely through a process of exclusion. The Lower Don Valley and adjacent 
areas were identified as priority areas, this being ‘driven by the need to sustain the 
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economic and regeneration processes of the area’ (SCC, 2013a). Formal defences 
in the city were few (SCC 2013b, 18) and difficult to finance. The possibility of flood 
relief spillways was impractical owing to the built-up character of the floodplain (SCC 
2013a, 17). Moreover, ‘building resilience within the community’ was discounted ‘as 
most of the existing buildings in the areas considered could not easily be adapted to 
withstand flooding.’ (SCC 2013b, 9). 
Despite references to community involvement, the initial style of decision 
making was led by experts (consultants and officials). Where consultation took place, 
with emphasis was on protecting business. At the same time, the cost of increased 
flood protection could not easily be justified under the funding formulas then in force. 
Instead, the local authority approached the business community to fill the gap 
through the declaration of a Business Improvement District (BID) for the Lower Don 
Valley- an area that covers a mixture of small traders near the city centre and a 
mixture of medium sized and large employers elsewhere.  
A BID is a legal mechanism, most commonly used in town and city centres, 
where businesses vote to pay additional taxes to support local improvements or 
management. If 50% of businesses and 50% of the total rateable value of 
businesses support the proposal then additional taxes are levied on all property 
owners within the BID area over a five year period. In this specific case, a majority of 
82% of voters and 95% of those based on rateable value approved the scheme in a 
ballot, held in December 2013. About 10% of the cost of the works (7% of the 
continuing budget) came from local business sources, the rest from different central 
government agencies. 8  
The measures within the BID area have comprised a mixture of strengthening 
barriers and preventative works such as the clearing of accumulated debris and 
vegetation from the river channel and the creation of a river monitoring system. The 
overall aim has been to lower the annual risk of flooding from 1:25 in places to a 
minimum of 1: 100, so allowing businesses to obtain insurance more easily (EA 
2013). The BID has also established a liaison officer in the Chamber of Commerce, 
managing communications with levy paying businesses and other stakeholder 
groups. In interview, it emerged that the response of local businesses was mixed, 
with some being reluctant to become involved and others being more proactive. 
Outside the BID area, policies comprise a mixture of protection works river 
clearance and the provision of sustainable urban drainage and associated amenity 
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measures (WYG Engineering 2010, 11). The model for the amenity measures 
became a new ‘pocket’ park at Nursery Street (Sheffield Star 04/08/2011: 
21/09/2012). The park was substantially reduced in its size at the detailed design 
stage owing to financial constraints. However, as completed in 2012, it still opened 
up a formerly constrained river channel. Similar schemes have also gone ahead as a 
nature reserve downstream of the main industrial and commercial area (Blackburn 
Meadows) 9 and as another pocket park along a small tributary (Matilda Street). 10 
Figure 4 
In additionthe search for more extensive upstream water storage led, during 
2016, to proposals to impound flood waters in existing parks at Endcliffe and 
Millhouses and in amenity woodland elsewhere. 11 The proposals are acknowledged 
to be ‘sensitive’ by officials (Sheffield Star, 27/07/2016 and 27/10/2016) and, at the 
time of the study, were  subject to public consultation, the form of which was itself 
contested. Concerned groups argue that more attention be paid to flood 
management on agricultural land and through the use of existing water reservoirs. 12  
Rotherham lies immediately downstream from Sheffield. The strategies for 
Sheffield are subject to coordination by the Environment Agency at a regional level 
so that they do not worsen the situation in Rotherham. There are, however, few 
formal mechanisms for direct coordination between the two local authorities.  
The first response in Rotherham, following the clean-up and repair exercises 
associated with the 2007 floods, comprised the erection of additional walls, piling 
and another overspill flood area at Templeborough. Otherwise, the policy has been 
mostly to promote property-level protection and safety measures through a toolkit 
incorporated into the planning system. The toolkit itself goes into considerable detail 
about the level of flood risk in different zones, the importance of safety in use, the 
treatment of surface water run-off and measures to minimise damage through water 
resistant fittings and materials. 13  
Other toolkits and sources of advice are available, for example from the 
Association of British Insurers (2016). However, the use of property-level toolkits is 
itself of limited value, as became apparent in the interviews. For the local authority, 
their publication amounted to an admission that it could no longer protect the highest 
risk areas. Indeed, in one passage, the Rotherham local plan states that ‘ideally 
development should be moved away from these areas’ (RMDC 2014, 144). There 
has been no attempt to implement any such policy, however.  
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For businesses, the advice given in the toolkits was not a priority, even if they 
were aware of the contents. In the words of an informant with much experience of 
local businesses: 
‘sometimes it can be a hard push ….. They (the businesses) are always trading off 
against other things that are important … and …  some of these things that are 
deemed aren’t quite as important as others, until something happens. ... People 
generally do the basics, what they absolutely must do to get through.’ 
The language of the advice was also problematic: 
‘having looked at some of the material I have to say not a lot of it’s very visual, it’s a 
lot of written stuff and they use a lot of terminology which is not self-explanatory to 
business people ‘ 
Every property is different and the application of the guidance to specific cases 
is often unclear in the absence of specialist advice that would be expensive to 
obtain. For smaller businesses, some support would be necessary. Yet, the local 
authority no longer has sufficient staff resources to offer free advice, if indeed it ever 
had the necessary staff resources. Some businesses assume that property-level 
protection is not for them, either because they have not been previously flooded or 
because of subsequent flood prevention measures or because the property is 
apparently unsuitable. In the words of the Director of a small business flooded in 
2007 and continuing in an unprotected area of the floodplain. ‘There's not much we 
can do to be honest, it'll just be a case of cracking on and trying to clean it up’.  
Discussion: the events in perspective 
The published documentation and the comments of respondents suggest an open-
ended, continuing process of risk management, much as is the assumption of socio-
ecological theories. The direction of change has been towards resilience, in line with 
most accounts. The extent of change can be easily exaggerated, however, 
depending on the exact meaning of resilience. For example, of the seven groups of 
recommendations listed in the Pitt review, only two: ‘speeding up recovery’ and the 
provision of ‘better advice and help’ fall directly within the scope of ‘resilience’ 
understood in ecological terms opposition to resistance.  
To say that the shift towards resilience is qualified is another way of saying that 
the promotion of resilience rather than resistance runs into a series of practical 
obstacles if taken too far. Yes, it is sensible to encourage residents, property owners 
and businesses to co-operate with one another and help themselves. However, the 
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consequences of flooding for business activities are so unpredictable and severe 
that owners and their managers want flood protection pure and simple. The 
damaging consequences of flooding are, moreover, compounded by the cost or 
impossibility of arranging business insurance in areas of higher flood risk.  
The ecological definition of resilience, in opposition to resistance is not the only 
definition, however. Resilience may also be defined as a ‘learning by doing process’ 
(Liao 2012). On this definition, a partial shift towards resilience may again be 
identified. There was a learning phase immediately after the flooding event, 
stimulated in part by the CAMINO and MARE initiatives, by the enquiries associated 
with the Pitt report, by the establishment of a strategic flood management and 
planning process that persists to the present and by the institional innovations 
associated with the establishment of the  BID in Sheffield.  
The various initiatives did not always realise their objectives. Transition, in the 
sense of a movement towards more sustainable building practices or adoption of an 
honest broker role has hardly started- mainly owing to a failure to provide 
encouragement or support for local measures, consistent with the findings of other 
case studies (Moloney and Horne 2015: Vandevyvere & Nevens 2015).Moreover,  
as became apparent in interview, there are doubts about whether learning, 
innovation and all the consultation that this involves can be maintained against a 
background of staffing cuts and restrictions.  
The BID itself deserves special mention as the best example of a creative 
innovation, involving new institional actors in flood management. The BID might 
suggest, moreover, that levying specific flood-oriented business taxes is a more 
practical policy than an emphasis on the promotion of property-level measures. The 
BID is not a spontaneous exercise in self-organisation, however, as might be 
suggested by community-based concepts of resilience. Its establishment 
presupposes the existence of a pre-existing legal framework that permits additional 
local taxation and, in addition, at the local level, a combination of local leadership 
amongst business groups; an acceptance of substantial public sector set-up costs 
(of a type that cannot be easily recovered); and finally the agreement of national 
funding agencies to cover the bulk of investment costs. As yet there are no reports of 
other BIDs being established for flood protection reasons in England.  
The phronetic case study method, as suggested by Flyvbjerg (2004: 2006), 
begs the question as to the winners and losers. Amongst local organisations, the 
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Chambers of Commerce emerged as key actors especially in the immediate 
aftermath of the flood because they had the contacts and were in a good position to 
collect and distribute information. Appeals to economic regeneration and job 
protection, especially the protection of jobs associated with large businesses in the 
lower Don Valley in Sheffield, offered a powerful discourse for action. Business and 
especially the larger businesses have therefore emerged as the biggest winner. 
Though flood protection work is still continuing in the BID area, businesses located 
there will soon face a reduced risk of flooding. The focus on business properties may 
be defended by the additional contributions made by property owners through the 
BID, by the role of the BID area in providing employment for residents of a wide area 
and by the way that protection of businesses has also involved the protection of 
urban infrastructure. Not all businesses have been protected, however. As shown in 
Table 3 and Figure 3, especially in Rotherham, many mostly smaller businesses 
remain at risk of flooding, with all its costs and disruption. 
The events of 2007 are sufficiently recent to be remembered in the interviews. 
Memory is important, moreover, in maintaining a sense of concern, as is a message 
of socio-cultural theory. Perceptions of events are invariably influenced by prior 
expectatations, however. The first measures taken in the BID were based directly on 
a belief that at least part of the problem has stemmed from a lack of publicly-funded 
river maintenance before 2007. Business interests were mobilised by the experience 
of flooding and, true to their preference for self-help, they blamed the neglect of 
public authorities for their predicament.  
The personal and community memory of flooding events figure in a slightly 
different way in the case study of Pickering, by Whatmore (2013) where proposals 
for ‘natural’ water retention originated from citizen involvement. In Sheffield and 
Rotherham,  in contrast, proposals for water retention emerged from technical 
analysis and, in their most recent formulation, in potential opposition to the views of 
residents. The relatively large size of the urban area and the involvement of business 
groups have led to a more hierarchical and ‘gridded’ response.  
The opposition between local residents and technical analysis has been 
interpreted by Haughton (2015) as a product of place attachment and its associated 
emotions. Other related interpretations are that conflicts arise owing to different 
priorities about the use of space (Kati and Jari 2016) or to contrasting attitudes to 
nature, for example between conservationists and the demands of securitisation 
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(Davoudi 2014). Emotions in planning and environmental policy are, of course, not 
just confined to place attachment. The experience of flooding and the threat to jobs 
is also an emotional issue, but this only serves to intensify the potential for conflict.  
In this context, if local groups are to have an effective voice, they will almost 
certainly need some form of technical support to allow the investigation of alternative 
methods of retaining flood water in places where it can do less damage. The use of 
amenity areas for water storage is controversial, but relatively simple in conception 
and simple in relation to the range of stakeholders. Other methods raise a multiplicity 
of issues and these go beyond the legal rigidities associated with property (Tempels 
and Hartmann, 2014). In some cases, such as the opening up culverted streams, the 
pattern of legal rights and obligations may indeed prove complex and disputed. 
Otherwise, the main obstacles derive from the use of property, rather than its legal 
character- the interests and expectations of owners and businesses, including 
agricultural owners; the costs of relocating economic activities; and, in the case of 
the reservoirs owned by Yorkshire Water, the cost of resolving the conflicting 
priorities of secure clean water supply and flood protection. These very complexities 
suggest the need for a wider debate about policy options despite the time and 
staffing costs previously noted as a disadvantage of public consultation exercises 
(for example by Menzel & Buchecker 2013). 
In Rotherham and Sheffield, issues of close administrative coordination have 
proved less important in the narrative of flood risk management than in the account 
of Hull by Coulthard and Frostick (2010). Hull is low lying and surface drainage is 
dependent on pumping stations that are owned by Yorkshire Water. As the 
comparison suggests, the material character of flood risk remains significant in 
determining the detailed administrative and policy arrangements. 
Conclusions 
Consideration of both theory and the case study require a clarification of the 
relation between theory and practice. Adaptive management and transition 
management both highlight risk management as a continuous and wide ranging 
exercise rather a series of disconnected engineering projects. Both involve social 
learning and therefore have value as normative theories that provide criteria of good 
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and bad practice. Both approaches, for example, highlight the blockages to learning, 
as these have arisen in the case study area. 
- the staffing costs involved in innovation and consultation;  
- the difficulties of reaching and communicating with small businesses so as 
to encourage property-level measures;  
- the lack of national support for transition measures; and  
- the complexity of dealing with a multiplicity of stakeholders and landowners 
with particular interests. 
Nevertheless, confusions arise when adaptive management is conflated simply 
with ‘resilience’, used without a precise definition. It is confusing, to use ecological 
concepts of ‘resilience’ so as to exclude any engineering works whatsoever. The 
conditions in Sheffield with existing heavily engineered watercourses and 
employment already concentrated on a floodplain amply demonstrates exactly how 
resilience and resistance, including engineering works, may co-exist with one 
another. Confusion is compounded, moreover, by a lack of political transparency. 
Understandings of resilience as process involve or imply a series of desirable 
attributes, responsiveness, effectiveness etc. Yet the policy discourse on resilience 
has also amounted to a tendency for the state to shift funding responsibility towards 
individuals, firms and businesses. That is exactly the implications of the BID in 
Sheffield and the property-level toolkits in Rotherham. Any such shift in responsibility 
will not necessarily be welcomed by those affected. For these reasons, policy and 
practice rests on an ambiguous and shifting balance between resistance and 
resilience. 
Politics and, as socio-cultural theory suggests, political culture are therefore 
crucial to events. Different styles of action involve different institutional 
arrangements, notably about the extent of individual and collective responsibility. 
Measures are, likely to reflect in part the campaigns of amenity and environmental 
groups in promoting oppositional, critical ‘green’ policies and solutions. Finally, 
learning is grounded in memory, so suggesting a need to maintain a collective, 
public memory of the 2007 event, even as personal memories fade. 
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Table 1: Applying socio-cultural theory to environmental risk management 
Style of action 
(Douglas 1999: Douglas and 
Wildavsky 1982) 
Implications for social organisation 
(Douglas and Wildavsky: Tansey 
2004, 26) 
Social assumptions of risk 
management  
High grid/ high group hierarchy and bureaucracy as a controlled environment 
Low grid/ high group egalitarianism and community as mutual aid 
Low grid/ low group the market and self-help as individual adaptation and initiative 
High grid/ low group isolation and fatalism as an acceptance of the inevitable 
 
Table 2: Frameworks for the analysis of environmental risk management 
Name of 
framework 
Adaptive management: Transition management: Expectation management 
Theoretical 
background 
Socio-ecological systems Technological innovation theory  Socio-cultural processes 
Ontological 
assumptions 
Impersonal, ecological systems- 
rainfall, water flows, habitats etc: 
Panarchy:  
Coupled social and technical 
systems: networks and 
interactions between actors 
The interaction between personal 
experience and social order 
Realm of 
application  
Generally spatial  
(natural parks, river basins,.) 
Sectors of the economy or 
government. 
The type and strength of social 
order 
Drivers of  
change 
Evolution of complex, ever-
changing and relatively unstable 
systems 
Multi-level pathways intended to 
unlock systems of technology, 
production and consumption 
The conflict between the centre 
and peripheral groups. 
Overall aim as 
applied to policy 
Promoting resilience: managing 
and reducing risk in an uncertain, 
not fully predictable context:  
Moving practice in the direction of 
sustainability: reducing long-term 
risks 
Resolving and recognising the 




Self-organisation: social learning: 
actions are designed as 
experiments at varied spatial 
scales. 
Planned co-evolution with 
providers and industry: multi-level 
learning, including experimental, 
local ‘niches’. 
‘Clumsy’ policy making, involving 




A broad consensus generated at 
a local or regional level 
Targets and policies set as part of 
the context 
A shifting process determined by 
of a variable political culture.  
Adapted, in part, from: Foxon et al 2009: Voß and Bornemann. 2011. 
 
Table 3: At risk properties in Sheffield and Rotherham 
 Sheffield Rotherham 
Annual Flood risk Residential Non-residential Residential Non-residential 
High: more than 1 in 30 
(>3.3%) 
217 173 29 190 
Medium: between 1 in 30 
(3.3%) and 1 in 100 (1%) 
3,042 709 182 318 
Low: between 1 in 100 (1%) 
and 1 in 1000 (0.1%).  
3,795 1,878 323 445 
Total  7,054 2,760 534 953 
Source: CDRC 2015 RoFRS Geodata Pack by the ESRC Consumer Data Research Centre; Contains National 
Statistics data Crown copyright and database right 2015; Contains Environmental Agency data copyright 2015 (under 
Open Government Licence) 
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